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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE B. FREEMAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
VS. 
CENTERVILLE ClTY, Golden L. Allen. Mayor: 
and CENTERVILLE PLANNING COMMISSION, 
E. Lee Hawkes. Chairman; and ROBERT B. 
HANSEN, Attorney General, State of Utah. 
Defendanb-Re~pondents. 
BRIEF' OJ<' .APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 2-24508 
This action was brought in the Second District Court in and for Davis County under 
the Declaratory Judgments Act. Plaintiff asked for a declaration of his constitutional right 
as a taxpayer which he claims is denied by proceedings of Centerville City in annexing plain-
tiff's property. 
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
From the District Court's ruling, the honorable J. Duffy Palmer, Judge, that plain-
tiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action, plaintiff has appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Appellant desires a declaration of his constitulional, self evident, due process, and sov-
ereign right to legal notice and election when his property is placed under the jurisdiction of 
;1 corporate entity wielding the political power to tax and create debt. 
1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties arc agreed that Centerville City has proceeded pursuant to Sec. J 0-2-·10 
UCA 1953, as amended, lo annex appellant's property and that appellant\ property will be ,
11 
jectcd to tax assessments, liens, and cncurnbranccs by suid city which arc the b:i:,ic ;"'· 
necessary for a deiermination of the issue in this appeal. ( Ans\vcr to Complaint. Scc-Jnd o 
fense, Para. 1) 
. ARGUMENT 
The case will be argued in the order set forth in the points: 
POINT I, establishes the basis of the argument. 
SUB POINT A, the right to legal notice specifically. 
SUB POINT B, the right to elective choice specifically. 
POINT II, emphasizes the basic law. 
POINT I 
SEC. 10-2-401, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT DENIES TO PROPERTY 
OWNERS THE BASIC, FUNDAMENTAL, EQUAL, AND SOVEREIGN 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN DEROGATION OF ART. I, 
SEC. 2, SEC, 7, SEC. 24, AND SEC. 27; AND ART. IV, SEC. I AND 
SEC. 8, CONSTITUTION OF UT AH -
The basic and fundamental due process right to legal notice and elective choice is n1 
provided in Sec. 10-2-401, UCA '53, the annexation statute. Said statute permits appellant 
property to be placed under the jurisdiction of a corporate entity which wields the politicJ 
police power to tax, bond, encumber, indebt, and control property without giving legal noti\ 
and election by the secret ballot which violates the due process clause of Art. I, Sec. 7, Cow 
of Utah, which states: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." 
Sec. 10-2-401, UCA '53, provides: 
"Whenever a majority of the owners of real property ... shall cause 
an accurate p!Jt or map ... to be filed in the office of the recorder of 
the municipality, together with a written petition; ... and the gov-
erning body of the municipality, at a regular meeting ... may by 
resolution ... accept the petition for annexation, subject to the terms 
and conditions as they deem rea:,onablc and the territory shall then and 
there be annexed and within the bciundarics of the municipality ., 
2 
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The right tu legal notice and elective chuicc is both a procedural and substantive due 
process right. 
16 Am . .fur.. #548, p. 940, states: 
"·Procedural due proccs, may be defined as the aspect of due process 
which relates Lo the rc4ui'>itc charnctcri<;tics of proceedings looking 
toward a deprivation of life, liberty, or property; ... " 
And at 1:357_ p. 683: 
"'The words "life. libcrl.J. ~me! propcrly' as uoed in constitutions are 
repre',entati1 ·~ 1erms. ;Jnd are intended to cover every right to which 
a member of the body p8litic is entitled under the law. These terms 
include ... the right to all liberties, personal, civil, and political ... " 
I 6A Corpus Juris Sec .. #567, p. 539, states: 
"In tlic course or d::vcloping its meaning the courts have gone beyond 
its literal meaning of due procedure and have brought within it 
substantive as well as procedural rights. When applied to substantive 
rights. it is interpreted to me~m that the government is without right 
to deprive a person of liJe, liberty or property ... " 
And at #574. p. 603-604: 
"The life and liberty of which a person may not be deprived without 
due process of law are not limited to freedom from mere physical harms 
or reslraint, but include all personal rights and the enjoyment thereof 
... The terms 'life' and 'liberty' urc ,:seJ in the constitutional guar-
antees in a broad senoe as including all personal as distinguished from 
property rights ... ?.nd generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men." 
By looking into the laws pertaining to municipal corporations at the time Utah became a 
state. it is evident that the right to legal notice and elective choice, when one's property is 
placed under the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation with the power to create debt for city 
services, is a basic and fundamental principle of liberty. 
Art. 1, Sec. 27. Const. of Utah, says: 
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the secur-
ity of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government" 
Ir. State v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 Pa~. 337, this court said at page 483 of 27 Utah: 
'"In construing the supreme law, the meaning of the framers must be 
a'iccrtai11cd from tlic whole purview of the instrument, and, in constru-
ing a particular section, the court may refer to any other section or 
provision to a•,ccrtain wkt'. was the object, purpose, and intention of 
the con.slitution makers in adopting such section. In a case like this 
the court will also con,ider the system of government in vogue prior 
3 
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to and at the time of the framing l'I the L'\lihtitutinn, and the p()litical 
history of the country, amL ou\ llf the d!lfcrc'lll con-;truction-, po">iblc. 
will adopt and apply that which i-, mu'>l in accord with thL· grniuc, of 
uur instilLttion-,, the most likely intended by the framer-, of the instru-
ment Texa-, & Pac Ry. v. !nter-S~ate Com .. 1 (>2 U.S. 197. 218: 
16 Sup. Ct. 66<>: 40 L. Ed. 940." 
When Utah became a state every municipal corporation with the political power to i"1, 
long term notes and create debt upon propcrty had as a requirement the ba,ic and fundament, 
due process right to legal notice and ~lection including the extending of city boundaric'. Leg, 
notice and election were required in ChapLer XL Compiled Laws of Utah 1888, An Act Pn 
viding for the Incorporation of Cities. in the toll owing articles: 
Art. I Creation 
Art. XV Local Tax Asse,sments for Improvements 
Art. XVI Elections 
Art. XVII How Corporate Limits May Be Extended (Quoted 
immediately below.) 
Art. XVIII Restriction of Corporate Limits 
Art. XIX How Cities May Disincorporate 
Art. XVII, the annexation statute, provided: 
"The boundaries of any municipal corporation may be altered and 
new territory included therein after proceedings had as required in this 
section. The council of such corporation sha!L upon receiving a peti-
tion signed by not less than two-fifths of the property owners . . . 
give notice thereof by publication ... (including notice of an election) 
... The votes cast in such territory so proposed to be annexed shall be 
canvassed separately, and if it shall show upon such canvass that the 
majority of all the votes cast in such territory, and majority of the votes 
cast in such corporation, shall be for annexation. such council shall ... 
make a certified abstract of such vote ... and ... file with the secre-
tary of the territory ... " 
If this law were in force today, the existing inh:ibitants of cities would have a voic 
as to whether promoters of subdivisions could have annexed into the cities farming propert: 
that must have expensive municipal services. Profits to promoters of such enterprises wouk 
not be so attractive if the properties so annexed carried the full tax burden of the munic1 
pal needs, but when all city taxpayers share the burden, debt and taxes in the city must inev1 
tably increase. A recent item in a Salt Lake daily newspaper stated that cities in Californi. 
have found tha: it would be cheaper to buy proposed subdivision land and retire it, than ti 
provide the necessary and expensive municipal service' which require expanded water am 
sewer systems. public parks, etc. 
Probably because our first legislature had to write all the new statutes for the new stale 
some statutes were borrowed from other state-;. Our annexation statute was copied frorr 
Nebraska ( #1448, Laws of Nebr. 1895.) The situation faced by most all lcgisaturcs by· 
Jog-jam of bills at adjournment time could ha\e contributed to the ncccs-,ity. Said statul 
4 
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uJ11t<1i11' rn: pru\ :·.w11 iw kg<tl i;otice nc1r elcct1on and is basicly our same statute of today 
I 10-2--101 UC 1\ 'if/iltl.) HoV,L\CJ, t!l·~ !ir·l urninagc District Act (Laws p. 593, 1896) which 
\1as cre<ited by llJ<.: fir l legislature, contained provisions for legal notice and election (Sec. 
701 and 76-1-. Title 17, CLU 1898.) 
SUB POINT A 
PF<.OPEl-nY 0WNERS AJ<.t-, DENIED HIE RIGHT TO LEGAL NO-
TICE. 
As seated hcrcinabU\e, at the ti111e our constitution was approved by the people, every 
municipal corporation with power to issue long term notes and create debt had the require-
ment of legal notice to affected property owners including the extending of city boundaries 
(supra.) This legal notice feature was incorporated into the new statutes in every instance 
except the annexation law. The due process right to legal notice when extending city bound-
aries mw.t have been inadvertently overlooked :md has lain unchallenged in the courts. This 
oversight of a fundamental due process of law is not so differentf rom the daily oversight 
most of us make of things plainly evident before our eyes. 
Our present day Utah Annotated Statutes ( 1953 as amended) provide for the basic 
and fundamental due process of legal notice: (a) Incorporation of cities (10-2-102), (b) 
Disconnection of territory ( 10-2-501), (c) Consolidation (10-2-606), (d) Disincorporation 
(I 0-2-703), ( e) Bonding (11-14-2), in fact most all special district taxing, bonding, and 
encumbrances upon property. However this due process right is ignored when property is 
annexed into a city. 
States surrounding Utah recognize the right to legal notice when property is annexed 
into cities unless all affected property owners have signed the petition: 
Nevada (Title 21, Chap. 268, Nev. Rev. Stat. 1977) 
Sec. 268.654 Counties less than 200,000 population: 
" ... shall cause to be published in a newspaper ... and ... shall send 
a copy ... to each owner of real property." 
Sec. 268.586 Counties 200,000 and over: 
"The notice ... shall fix date, hour. and place ... describe the terri-
tory to be annexed. contain a fot of names and addresses of all record 
owner;; ... and . . published in newspaper." 
Idaho ( 50-222. Title 50, Chap. 2, Idaho Code 1978): 
"WhL'i~c\c:r <1;1y land l1i11g contigcwus or adjacent ... by or with the 
owner's authority or acquie,cence laid off into blocks containing not 
more than five ( 5) ~1cres of land each ... requests annexation in 
wntrng . . it shall be competent for the council, by ordinance, to 
declare the same . . a part of 'uch city." 
Wyoming ( 15-1-501. Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1977): 
15-1-503 'The clerk shzi.11 give notice ... by publishing ... at least 
twice in a newsriapcr ... and by mailing a copy ... to the property 
o\lliU"" Tile notice shall contain a legal description of the area and 
tlic nal!lc, of the person:, owning property within the area." 
5 
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Colorado ( 31-12-101, Colo. Rev. Stat. 1973): 
31-12-108 "Said notice shall be published once a week for four suc-
cessive weeks ... " 
Nebraska has amended its annexation statute con:,idcrably to cover the different classes c 
cities (Chapters 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 Rev. Stat. Df Nebr. 1977). 
For example, Sec. 15-106, is similar lo ld,1ho: 
The proprietor of any land' within the corporate limits or contiguous 
thereto may lay out such land into lots, blocks, public ways ... , file 
plat and ... the city council may include ... within the boundaries 
of the city." 
Each of the different classes have a provi,ion as follows: 
"This grant of power shall not be construed as conferring power upon 
the council to extend the lines of a city over agriculture lands which 
are rural in character." 
In the instant case many farms of more than five ( 5) acres are included and practicall 
the entire area is rural in character. 
Art. I, Sec. 24, Const. of Utah, states: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
The basic right to due process of legal notice in the instant case cannot be classified afo 
said to apply to a group of people whose property is placed under the jurisdiction of a mum 
cipal corporation with the political power to tax, bond, encumber, indebt, and control sat< 
property when the city is created; and then deny it to other property owners when the1 
property is so placed under identical circumstances, conditions, and situations by annex, 
tion. The basic and fundamental due process right to legal notice is one of the political righ1 
which is inherent in the people and cannot be taken away. 
Art. I, Sec. 2, Const. of Utah, states: 
"All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments 
are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit ... " 
16 Am. Jur. 2d, #488, p. 849, says: 
"The guilding principle most often stated by the courts is that the con-
stitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws requires that all 
persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions, 
both in the privilege conferred and in the liabilities imposed. 
Footnote: The decisions supporting this proposition are virtually 
limitless in number. The following is a small sampling: ... " 
(Cases cited in small print occupy the two columns three fourths 
of the page.) 
6 
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Our clllllC.\at1u11 :,t<etutc rcmaiDuJ practically unchanged until 1977 when the words 
"al the lK\i rcguhr mcc'.ing·· were 2m 1:ndcd co 'at a regular meeting" because of an adverse 
opinion in/,,, .en \'. [/uu,:1if1:/ City, 20 Utah 2d l 89, 281 Pac 2d 216 (1975). With this revi-
c,ion d1·: 'Ltluk heh b·~corn~ c:ven mmc l1ncon:o'.itutional and unjust. Promoters of subdivisions 
~,tt1 nm1 11~c:udc p;·opcrty in their ariI1cxation plats at the last moment, and cities can annex 
in1mediai·Jy 11p1.1 11 prc .. ellla 1 iun u~ the petition without notice of any kind whatsoever to inter-
c.,tcd a11d arfcctcd partie'-> as in the instant case which leaves no opportunity to build a def 
:nsc. 
Respondent> aosertcd in the lower court that appellant did in fact appear at the hearing 
1!1 lhc in:,tanl case (Sec transcript). Appellant had been advised approNimately one month 
prior io ;.aiJ hcarinz that then; was insufficient support for annexation of his particular section 
''ncl that it had been abandoned. He was surprised by an urgent call from a neighbor on 
the 1 er; d"Jy of a hearing before the planning board on the annexation petition. 
After s'eps were taken to counter the petition, the propor,ents changed the boundaries 
of the plat. Appellant felt that he was in a situation like a mouse under the paw of a cat which 
left him no recourse but to look into the laws and statutes where he discovered the glaring 
oversight of a ba-,ic and fundamental due process right to legal notice. If legal notice describ-
ing the boundaries were published such a miscarriage of justice could not occur. 
Appellant a~:ks this court for a declaration of his right to legal notice when his property 
is placed under the jurisdiction of a corporate entity wielding the political power to tax and 
create debt. 
SUB POINT B 
THE RIGHT TO AN ELECTIVE CHOICE BY BALLOT IS DENIED. 
The basic right to election was also part of every act pertaining to municipal corpora-
tions al the time of statehood and was incorporated into all the new statutes of the new 
:ocate except the extending of city boundaries. That the elective process is a basic tenant of 
libcrly is cviden( in that this due process right is provided in our statutes today for incorpora-
tion of cities. consolidation, disincorporation, bonding, etc. (See ref. hereinabove.) 
The Colorado statute (31-12-112 CRS 1973) provides: 
''The municipality shail forthwith petition the district court of the 
county ... to hold such election." 
Sec. 31-12-107 of the Colorado statute provides for annexation by ordinance: 
"PROVIDED. the ordinance annexing such area shall include a state-
ment that the owners of one hundred percent of the area have petitioned 
for such annexation."' 
Thi,, kc:1c:. inviolate the due process right of election by the secret ballot even though 
'·"!'; of ti, c>;'~!'lY owners sign the petition. Election in such and similar circumstances is 
:111 i:iilc'1 ut1 1 ig\:' 11hich cannot be taken away from the people. 
7 
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Art. IV, Sec. 1, Const. of Utah, states: 
'The rights of citizcm of the state of Uiah to vole ... shall not be 
denied or abridged . 
And Sec. 8, states: 
"All elections shall be by secret ballot . 
This due process right to election by the secret ballot is a basic and fundamental principi 
to a free people and has long been recognized as the only method whereby the expression r' 
public sentiment can be honestly ascertained. 
Cooley's Const. Lim. 6th, Ed., p. 760, says: 
"The distinguishing feature of this mode (secret ballot) of voting is, 
that every voter is thus enabled to secure and preserve the most com-
plete and inviolable secrecy ... and thus escape the influence which 
may be brought to bear upon him with a view to overbear and intimi-
date, and thus prevent the real expression of public sentiment." 
Appellant had intended to call witnesses and present evidence at the trial of this cas 
to show that besides using men of popular and .-official civic and church stature, pecuniar 
considerations were used to influence the petition drive by the proponents of said annexation 
However, such evidence could only bring embarrassment to some and delay the adjudic' 
tion of the basic, vital, and important constitional question involved and could not effo 
the correcting of the continuing wrongs being perpetuated by a city extending its boundaries, lil 
an insatiable octopus, to supposedly increase its "tax base" and enhance its importance by prr 
viding ever growing and expanding economic needs for some people at the expense of other! 
which leads to despotism unless held under control by constitutional limitations. 
POINT II 
THE CONSTITUTION IS THE LAW OF THIS ST A TE, NOT A LEGIS-
LATIVE ENACTMENT. 
The fundamental principles "essential to the security of individual rights and the per 
petuity of free government" expressed in Art. I, Sec. 27, supra, permeate the entire two vo! 
umes of the Proceedings of our Constitutional Convention. The "conservative" and "liberal 
arguments of today were all expressed at that time. The minority wanted the new legislatun 
to have a free hand to decide and provide for the wants and needs of the people. In other word 
they wanted a democracy instead of rule by comtitutional law, a republic. 
The fundamental principle of rule by constitutional law was well expressed on the f!0\1 
of our Constitutional Convention by Mr. Varian, Proceedings, Vol. II, p. 996: 
"There have been ... propositions, which some of us thought might 
well have been left to the decision of the people . . . which in the 
opinion of the majority on this floor, have not been permitted to prevail. 
What is the object of a constitution '7 It is not alone to declare what 
everybody knows to be self evident facts concerning life, liberty, (l/U/ 
property. It is also to include prohibitions against future mistakes and 
wrongs that may be committed by the people." (Emphasis added) 
8 
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The 1rnnority \icw al the '.,aid conYcntion was expressed by respondents at the hearing 
of thi'> case in the loWL'r court. Respondents quoted 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Part B, #57, p. 113, (See 
transcript) . 
"The power to a1~11ex co11tiguous territory to municipal e-0rporations is 
a legislative power, e.xisting exclusivdy in the legislature as an incident 
to the power to create and abolish iihinicipal corporation at will." 
However. the fir:,t sentence of Part B, :/¢55, p. 111, says: 
"In th!' ub11'.'l!'e of cowtitutionul limitations the legislature has full 
power in its discretion ... " (Emphasis added) 
As a matter of fact, Part A. ;1¢50, p. 108, Ex;"nsion of Boundaries, General, says: 
"In the u/J.1!'nce of any constitutional restriction the legislature has full 
power in its di:,cretion ... " (Emphasis added) 
Mr. McQuillin even questions the right lo unlimited control in the absence of consti-
tutional restrictions. I McQuillin Mun. Corp. 2d Ed .. #188, p. 545-6, says: 
"It i' difficult to accept in its en~irety Lhe doctrine of absolute unlim-
ited legislative control, if the view should be adopted which is undoubt-
edly historically correct, that lucal self-government of the municipal 
corporation does not spring from, nor exist by virtue of, written consti-
tutions, nor is it a mere privilege conferred by the central authority. 
The fact is, as repeatedly pointed out, that the people of the various 
organized communities exercised their rights of local self-government 
under the protection of these fundamental principles which were 
accepted, without doubt or question, when the several constitutions 
were promulgated. 
"Therefore, it appears clear that in a government in which the legis-
lative power of a state is not omnipotent, and in which it is axiomatic 
that local self-government is not a mere privilege, but a matter of abso-
lute political right, the existenc:- of unlimited authority in the state 
does not exist. Graham v. Fre.1no, 151 Cal. 465, 91Pac.147; Blanding 
r. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Stute ex rel. v. Barker, 89 N.W. 204 (Ia.): 
People ev rel v. Detroit, 29 Mich. 108; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 
44; Helena Cons. Water Co. v. Steel, 49 Pac. 382 (Mont.); Wolff v. 
New Orleans, I 03 U.S. 358." 
Sec. 10-2-40 J, UC A, supra, denies to appellant a basic and fundamental due process 
right to life, liberty, and property which is "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men." 
I 6A Corpus Juris Sec., #567, p. 540, states: 
"The term 'due process of law' is synonymous or interchangeable with 
or equivalent to 'law of the l::mcl,' a phrase appearing in many state 
constitutions. due process of law being said to mean in brief, the law 
of the land. including the unwritten law." 
And at #568, p. 545: 
"Certainly 'due process of law: or 'the law of the land,' does not mean 
merely an act of the legislature. for such a construction would abrogate 
all re;,t11ctions on legislative power." 
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Cooley's Const. Lim. 6th Ed., p. 436, say;: 
"It is entirely correct, :.ilso, in assuming that a legislative enactment 
is not necessarily the law of the land. The words 'by the law of the 
hand' as used in the constitution. do not mean a statute pas:,cd for the 
purpose of working the wroi1g. That corn.truction would render the 
restriction absolutely nugatory, and turn thi:' part of the con:;titution 
into mere nonsense. Tl1e people would be made (~) say to the two 
houses; 'You shall be vested with the legislative power of the ;;tatc. 
but no one shall be di:Jrapchised or deprived of any the rights or 
privileges of a citizen, unless you 1nss a statute for that purpose. 
In other words you shall not do the wrong unless you choose to do it.' 
Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140."' 
Because the basic and fundamental due process right to legal notice and election 
secret ballot is a "self evident fact concerning life. liberty, and property," appellant as 
this court to declare his constitutional, self evident, due process, and sovereign right there 
when his property is annexed into a city. These rights have been and arc now granted 
and enjoyed by other property owners in like and similar circumstances, and as stated in 
I, Sec. 2, supra, "all free governments are founded by the people for their equal protecti 
and benefit." 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant is attorney for himself ( 1) because of financial considerations, and 
he hesitates to place this vital and important issue into the hands of someone who might 
affected by possible harrassment for taking an unpopular stand in defense of principles invol 
ing local sdf-government and less centralized control by government; for less centralized cont 
is contrary to the marshalled and pushed plans to municipally incorporate entire counti 
to provide municipal services for subdivision property in unincorporated areas which 
expand the "municipal tax base" and aid and abet our ever mounting debt, inflation, and tax 
but which experience teaches enhances the fortunes of certain special interest groups a 
private individuals. 
Appellant has set his pen and voice in defense of the constitutional form of our repub' 
which is a government ruled by the constitutional law rather than by regulations, resolutio 
and fancies of men which is prelude to dictatorship and slavery. A godless philosophy 
moving to engulf us and the existence of our Judeo-Christian, free enterprise western ci 
zation is in grave jeopardy. 
Appellant asks this court to stand in the dignity of their duty as watchmen on the tow 
guarding our constitutional freedoms and, thus. keep alive the affirmation in the preamble 
our state constitution: "Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty." 
Respectfully submitted, 
Clyde B. Freeman 
Appellant 
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